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Abstract. In English a verb like know can take both declarative and interrogative com-
plements. By contrast, a verb like believe takes only declarative complements, and sym-
metrically, a verb like wonder takes only interrogative complements. Thus, one cannot
say :
(1) *John wonders that Mary came
(2) *John believes whether Mary came
These contrasts are robust across languages, and substantial work has been devoted to
the comparative treatment of verbs of the know kind and verbs of the wonder kind, both
in the early literature on questions (Groenendijk and Stokhof 1982), and more recently in
relation to the phenomenon known as quantificational variability (Berman 1991, Sharvit
& Beck 2001, Lahiri 2002). There has been less discussion, in comparison, of the failure of
a verb like believe to take interrogative complements. A basic intuition, which I call the
factivity hypothesis, suggests that the lack of factivity of believe may explain its failure to
embed questions, by contrast to the case of know, which is factive and licences questions.
This suggests an empirical generalization, namely that the only verbs which take both
declarative and interrogative complements are the factive verbs. In this paper, my aim is
to defend the factivity hypothesis, and to show that it is empirically adequate, provided
the notion of factivity is sufficiently refined.
Indeed the generalization faces both a foundational and an empirical problem. At the
empirical level, the data suggest that factivity is neither necessary nor sufficient for a verb
that takes declarative complements to take questions. Thus a verb like regret, in English,
is considered factive, but does not embed questions (Lahiri 2002) :
(3) *Peter regrets whether Mary came / *who came
Conversely, a verb like tell, which is considered non-factive with regard to its declarative
complements, can nevertheless embed questions. At the foundational level, on the other
hand, the problem is to explain the alleged correlation between factiveness and questions.
Thus a version of the factivity hypothesis is formulated implicitly in Ginzurg 1995, who
suggests that the difference of embedding behavior between believe and know can be traced
to an ambiguity in ‘that’-clauses. On this view, a verb like know takes facts in its denota-
tion, while a verb like believe takes only propositions. Facts are assumed to be irreducible
to true propositions, and Ginzburg postulates that a question, unlike a fact, cannot be
coerced to a proposition. Although the intuitions underlying Ginzburg’s account seem cor-
rect, his account remains essentially stipulative, and it does not explain why regret, which
presumably takes facts in its denotation, fails to embed questions.
I deal with the foundational and empirical issues in turn. In the first part of the paper,
I suggest to use the framework of Groenendijk and Stokhof’s intensional theory of ques-
tions. A question is defined by Groenendijk and Stokhof as a variable or index-dependent
proposition, whose value is determined directly by the context. Thus, to know whether p is
to know that p if p is true, and that not p if p is false. It is easy to show that if a predicate
is factive, then whenever it embeds a proposition, this proposition thereby corresponds to
the (extension of) the question corresponding to that proposition. Like believe, know takes
a proposition in its denotation, but this proposition is an index-dependent proposition,
which can be type-shifted to (the intension of) the corresponding question. Thus one can
explain that know and believe do not have exactly the same kind of complement, without
postulating a difference between facts and true propositions.
The second part of the paper addresses the problems of regret and tell. Tell may not be
a real objection to the generalization under discussion, since it is generally admitted that
this verb becomes factive with respect to its interrogative complements : one cannot say
“John told who came” if he gave a false information as to who came. In the case of regret,
I claim that this verb is not genuinely factive. Thus, one can consistently say :
(4) Peter wrongly believes that Mary is getting married, and he regrets that she does
not stay single.
The real presupposition of “x regrets that p”, as suggested by Schlenker (2004), seems to
be “x believes that p”, and not “x knows that p” or “p”. Thus, although regret takes a true
proposition as object in most cases, this proposition is not an index-dependent proposition
in the sense of Groenendijk and Stokhof, and therefore does not licence questions.
Further indication that regret patterns like believe rather than know can be seen from
the mood behavior of savoir, croire, and regretter in French. In French, the complement
of a verb like regretter has to be in the subjunctive mood, as is the case more generally of
optative predicates :
(5) Pierre regrette que Marie s’en aille
Pierre regrets that Marie leaveSUBJ, 3rd−sg
(6) *Pierre regrette que Marie s’en va
Pierre regrets that Marie leaveIND, 3rd−sg
Conversely, factive verbs which are question-taking, like savoir, or de´couvrir, require
the indicative mood even when negated, as in (7), (8) :
(7) *Pierre sait que Marie soit venue
Pierre knows that Marie beSUBJ, 3rd−sg come over
(8) *Pierre ne sait pas que Marie soit venue
Pierre does not know that Marie beSUBJ, 3rd−sg come over
Interestingly, a verb like se souvenir, which is factive with the indicative mood, loses its
presupposition when negated and followed by the subjunctive, as shown by the contrast :
(9) Pierre ne se souvient pas que Marie est venue (⇒ Marie est venue)
Pierre does not remember that Marie beIND, 3rd−sg come over
(10) Pierre ne se souvient pas que Marie soit venue (; Marie est venue)
Pierre does not remember that Marie beSUBJ, 3rd−sg come over
An analogous contrast, although attenuated, can be observed with croire, which also
licenses the subjunctive under negation :
(11) Pierre ne croit pas que Marie est venue
Pierre does not believe that Marie beIND, 3rd−sg come over
(12) Pierre ne croit pas que Marie soit venue
Pierre does not believe that Marie beSUBJ, 3rd−sg come over
With respect to French, one may define as factive indicative a verb which is factive
when its embedded clause is in the indicative, but which loses its presupposition when
the embedded clause can be in the subjunctive. Se souvenir, like savoir, are thus factive
indicative, contrary to regretter. A generalization about French seems to be that the verbs
which take both declarative and interrogative complements are exactly the factive indica-
tive verbs. If it is correct, this generalization suggests a deeper connection between mood
and the question-taking behavior of attitude verbs.
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